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I.
Appellee's Advocacy for a Mixed Standard of Review is Contrary to Clear Utah Case Law
Which Mandates that Decisions on Motions to Dismiss are Reviewed for Correctness.
"As with a directed verdict, whether dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima
facie case is a question of law reviewed for correctness." Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581 (Utah
App. 1999).

n.
Appellee Erroneously Argues for Application of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),
which is critically distinct from Utah's Rule of Civil Proceure 41(b).
The Appellee points out that the Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) has been amended to delete the phrase
limiting a motion to dismiss to after a plaintiff concluded his case in chief, and that therefore in the
federal system, courts have approved of dismissals under 41(b) prior to the completion of the
plaintiff s case. See Appellee's Brief p. 14.
Appellee's argument support's the Appellant's position.
The fact that the phrase in question has not been deleted from Utah's Rule 41(b) means that
in Utah state courts, a motion to dismiss is to be considered "[a]fter the plaintiff. . .has completed
the presentation of his evidence." See Utah R. Civ. P. If Utah follows the federal rules' lead and
deletes that clause, then motions to dismiss would thereafter be appropriately considered earlier than
the plaintiffs completion of the presentation of his evidence. Until and unless that happens,
however, the rule should be followed as written.

III.

The Court's Weighing of Evidence and Deciding of Issues of Fact vis-a-vis the Motion to
Dismiss, Without Deference to the Non-Moving Party,
Prior to the Close of the Plaintiffs Case, Was Error.
While it Would Have Been Appropriate to Make the Decision in Such a Manner,
at the Close of the Plaintiffs Case, it was Inappropriate to do so
in the Middle of the Plaintiffs Case.

Appellee erroneously dismisses the standards presented in Appellant's brief as inapplicable
because this was tried to a judge and not a jury, and was thus a motion to dismiss rather than a
motion for directed verdict; therefore, the Appellee argues that the Court can weigh the evidence
without resolving inferences in favor of the non-moving party and without considering whether there
remain any doubt as to the facts or any conflicting inferences which maybe clarified with additional
testimony and evidence. See Appellee's Brief p. 10-12.
The problem with the Appellee's argument is that the Court did not wait until the close of
the Plaintiffs case, but rather cut that case short and ruled prior to hearing all of the Plaintiffs
evidence. As such, the Court should have employed a more deferential standard (i.e., inferences in
favor of non-moving party; if doubts exist, continue with the trial; etc.. See cases cited on pp. 11 -12
of Appellant's Opening Brief.) rather than weighing the evidence as presented up to that point and
making final findings and conclusions prematurely. In the case of Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581
(Utah App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals explains that motions styled as "motions for directed
verdict," when brought in bench trials, are really motions to dismiss, and that courts are allowed to
weigh evidence - after the manner suggested by the Appellee - but the critical distinction, ignored
by the Appellee, between Grossen and the instant case, is that the district court in Grossen waited
until the close of the Plaintiffs case. See id. at 583. The appellate decision repeatedly recites the
2

fact that the weighing of evidence standard is appropriate for motions to dismiss brought in bench
trial at the close of the plaintiffs case. See id. at 583, 584.
The Gossen court thus states:
In the context of a bench trial.. .where there is no jury verdict, the directed verdict's
procedural counterpart is a motion to dismiss. See 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial §§ 855
(1991) ("When a case is tried by the court without a jury, and a defendant moves for
a judgment at the close of the plaintiffs case, the defendant is seeking an
involuntary dismissal, not a directed verdict."). Rule 4 Kb) provides in relevant part:
After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a jury,
has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant,
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and
render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make
findings as provided in Rule 52(a).
UtahR. Civ. P. 4Kb),
(emphasis added).
Because the motion was made and ruled upon prior to the closing of the plaintiffs case, it
was more akin to a motion to dismiss brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 12 or a motion for summary
judgment brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 56 , and should be governed by a standard more akin to such
motions - the common characteristic being the court deciding the case without hearing all the
plaintiffs evidence. As such, in those motions as well as in the instant case, the Court should have,
contrary to the standard advocated by the Appellee, given deference to , and drawn inferences and
resolved doubts in favor of, the non-moving party. See, e.g., Young v. Texas Co., 331 P.2d 1099
(1958) (deference to non-moving party in 12(b)(6) motions); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (deferential
standard stated in text of rule itself). This makes sense because the Court, in each of these scenarios,
is deciding whether to find against the non-moving party, without considering all the evidence the
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non-moving party has to offer. If the court is going to do so, then it needs to utilize a standard
deferential to the non-moving party, regardless of whether the trial is to the bench or not (the
deferential standard under Rule 12 or Rule 56 applies regardless of whether trial will be to bench or
jury). In this case, had the Court waited until the close of the Plaintiffs evidence, as Rule 41
envisions, then this deferential standard would not apply, because no final decision would have been
made without the hearing the plaintiffs evidence by the finder of fact. However, that was not what
happened. The Court ruled without hearing all the plaintiffs evidence.1

IV.
Actually Receiving Into Evidence the Testimony and Evidence Which Plaintiff was Forced
to Merely Proffer, Could Have Changed the Outcome, and Thus Should have Been
Received and Weighed Prior to Any Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss

Actually hearing and receiving the proffered testimony and evidence could have altered the
outcome of this case.
The proffer bears repeating:

1

Appellee interestingly argues that the proffered testimony should not be considered
because, Appellee contends, Appellant did not marshall the evidence.
First, Appellant did marshall the evidence - the facts, including those negative to
Appellant, as were found by the Court (the findings were written by the Appellees themselves —
it was their proposed order) were recited basically verbatim in Appellant's brief.
Second, Appellee's argument regarding marshalling is off base because the whole point
of Appellant's argument is that a weighing of evidence prior to all that evidence's submission,
and the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law, was not in order at the point in time of
the trial that they were entered, per Rule 41; Appellant is not arguing that the findings of fact
were clearly erroneous and that this court should enter contrary findings. Rather, Appellant is
arguing that the timing and standard under which those findings, and the attendant conclusion to
dismiss the case, were in error - as matters of law. Thus the marshaling argument is inapposite.
4

A.

That the superintendent would admit that he terminated Mr. Ashby because he was

upset with him and dissatisfied with his services stemming from the Chapter I incident and because
Mr. Ashby was sick, rather than because of the master's degree/falsehood issue; that he made an
agreement with Mr. Ashby to resolve the master's degree issue by moving him down a step, but that
the superintendent abandoned this agreement and fired Mr. Ashby instead; and that other employees
of SSSD have been found to be on the wrong salary track/lane and that SSSD has not fired them; and
that sometimes SSSD does put people on the salary track/lane that does not correspond with their
educational record and that that is OK and sometimes happens, and that if it causes problems it can
be corrected without firing. Tr. at 278-279.
B.

That an SSSD employee would testify that she was in fact in charge of the Chapter

I program during the year the audit was performed, and that she would corroborate Mr. Ashby's
testimony regarding what happened with respect to the audit. Tr. at 279.
C.

That Mr. Ashby's principal would testify that Mr. Ashby did a great job teaching

after he was retained as an employee for the district after the audit debacle, and that SSSD was
surprised by this and was hoping he would fail, as SSSD was looking for a way to get rid of Mr.
Ashby. Tr. at 279.
D.

That Mr. Ashby's principal at the time of the Chapter I audit would corroborate Mr.

Ashby's testimony surrounding the Chapter I issues, and specifically the superintendant's statement
to the principal that he would put Mr. Ashby on probation and find a way to terminate him." Tr. at
279.
E.

That two other SSSD would corroborate Mr. Ashby's testimony regarding the
5

Chapter I related incidents. Id.
F.

That the principal at the time Mr. Ashby was hired would corroborate Mr. Ashby's

testimony regarding how he was hired and how he was truthful, and how it was known that Mr.
Ashby did not have a master's degree, and that Mr. Ashby was told not to tell others about how
he was put on the master's track. Id.
G.

That Mr. Ashby's principal during the Chapter I audit would corroborate Mr.

Ashby's testimony that school officials asked him to mislead the auditors, and that the
superintendent berated Mr. Ashby for the audit failure and indicated he would be put on probation
and that they would find a way to terminate him. Tr. at 280.
H.

That the superintendent's secretary and other SSSD employees would admit that

Mr. Ashby never said he had a master's degree and that he directed them to inspect his
employment file, and that while he may have been equivocal about the issue, he never directly
represented that he had a master's degree, but instead directed them to his file. Id.
I.

That an SSSD employee involved in Mr. Ashby's hiring would testify it was a

practice of small school districts to offer people to be on higher salary tracks to get them to come to
small districts, and that he was not deceived and that Mr. Ashby told him correctly of his actual
credentials. Id.
Basically, this proffered testimony and evidence raises doubts, and if those doubts, and all
inferences, are drawn in favor of Mr. Ashby, it must be said that the Court could have concluded in
the end that while Mr. Ashby may have in some senses of the word, and in some contexts, been
"deceptive," as Mr. Ashby forthrightly admitted, the Court could also have concluded that the district
6

knew of his true credentials and thus was not deceived, and thus did not have legitimate reason to
fire Mr. Ashby, but rather fired him because of the fallout from the audit. In such a scenario,
Plaintiff could have made out a prima facie case for breach of contract.
It should be noted that litigants cannot be forced to proffer testimony and evidence, as the
weight and impact of the live and actual testimony and evidence may prove persuasive in favor of
its proponent. See State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992). Contrary to this clear legal
standard, this was what occurred in this case. Plaintiff was forced to proffer his evidence, and in
such form it was not convincing to the Court in his weighing of the evidence from the Plaintiffs own
testimony, which admittedly contained damaging admission, but which also would have been
contradicted by the proffered testimony. Without the opportunity to present that proffered testimony
live, the Court was unconvinced by it in its proffered form and, without applying any deference to
the non-moving party, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. As such, we are left to guess
whether the proffered testimony could have mitigated, explained, and ultimately surmounted the
challenges admittedly posed to the plaintiffs case by his own admission vis-a-vis deceptiveness.
The court took away that opportunity by making its premature decision to dismiss the case. That was
error.

7

CONCLUSION
The Judgement and Order on Directed Verdict should be reversed and the case should be
remanded for trial.
Dated this
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